 |
|||||||
 |
 |
|
|||||
National Association of Attorneys General
September/October 1994 The Communications Revolution: A Drug Trafficker’s DreamBy Roseanna De Maria, Corporate Vice President, Risk Management, LIN Broadcasting CompanyThe communications revolution has spawned a multitude of benefits. Business opportunities are no longer routinely lost by virtue of an executive’s inability to contact his or her associates; today, business people are generally accessibly by “beeper” or “mobile phone.” Similarly, the fact that a critical document may be a continent away does not present a significant problem; it can be “faxed” virtually anywhere and, through the use of “modems” and a telephone line, a document can be transmitted from one computer to another. Or is there any need today for an all-important check to “clear;” funds can be transmitted instantly over a wire. Notwithstanding those benefits, the communications revolution has had profoundly negative effects as well. Drug traffickers and money launderers have so quickly adapted to the changes in communications technology that beepers, mobile “cellular” phones, fax machines and wire transfers are as readily associated in the public mind with narcotics and money laundering transactions as they are with legitimate business deals. For instance, beepers are so closely identified with the illicit narcotics industry that there have been startling proposals to bar teenagers from using them. See, e.g., Washington Times, Those Blipping Beepers: Who Needs ’Em? Pg. E1 (July 23, 1991). And, a bill has been introduced in Congress that would allow the Courts to order that mobile phones, beepers and fax machines of suspected drug dealers be disconnected. See, e.g. Associated Press, We’re Congress and We’ve Got a Bill for You, Sunday A.M. Cycle (January 6, 1991). Finally, wire transfers have been specifically included among the kinds of monetary transactions that, when used to launder proceeds of certain criminal activity, can give rise to severe criminal penalties. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1956. It is very easy to understand why beepers, cellular phones, fax machines, computers and wire transfer facilities are being misused by narcotics distribution networks. The leaders of these organizations rarely, if ever, become involved in “hand to hand” exchanges of their product for money. Rather, they rely on distribution and collection schemes that are roughly analogous to the manner win which the chief executive officer of a legitimate corporation distributes the company’s product and receives revenue in return. While the “kingpin” sets forth the general instructions for distribution, he or she typically relies on a team of lower-level managers who, in turn, rely on a staff of low-level distributors and sales people to handle the day-to-day task of delivering the network’s wares and collecting the organization’s income. This pyramid-like structure promotes efficient distribution of the organization’s product and insulates high-level traffickers from criminal accountability. A reliable communications system is vital to the success of such distribution networks; indeed, it is the availability of sophisticated communication techniques that permits the kingpin to ply his or her wares and launder dirty money without being in the presence of either the product or the proceeds. Without the use of mobile “cellular” phones, beepers, fax machines and wire transfers, the kingpin would be forced to assume a greater risk of detection by personally supervising the drug-dealing and money-laundering activities of subordinates, subjecting the kingpin to potentially successful surveillances and other traditional law enforcement techniques. The regular use of mobile phones and other sophisticated communications devices by high-level narcotics traffickers demonstrates that wiretaps, “bugs,” and “cloned” beepers often are the only means through which a kingpin can be apprehended, prosecuted and convicted. However, the most sophisticated traffickers are learning to exploit the logistical difficulties that are inherent in investigations that depend upon electronic surveillance. Shrewd kingpins have learned that wiretap, “clone” beeper and “bug” orders not only take some time to implement, but always expire within a month. Accordingly, to the chagrin of dedicated case agents everywhere, drug kingpins “change” their phone numbers, beepers and “stash” locations periodically and as a matter of course in much the same way (albeit not as frequently) as one “changes” clothing. This tactic is designed to, and sometimes does, frustrate investigations dependent upon electronic surveillance. If a drug trafficker religiously adheres to a policy of switching his or her mobile phone number every thirty days, it is conceivable that a law enforcement agency will be unable to intercept a pertinent phone call for months.
It is very easy to understand why beepers, cellular phones, fax machines, computers and wire transfer facilities are being misused by narcotics distribution networks…they rely on distribution and collection schemes that are roughly analogous to the manner in which the chief executive officer of a legitimate corporation distributes the company’s product and receives revenue in return.
For example, even assuming that the agency learns the trafficker’s phone number and obtains an eavesdropping warrant within the first week that they phone is activated, it usually takes a few days for a wiretap to be installed1. In fact, when mobile phones are involved, extraneous factors can delay the execution of an eavesdropping warrant indefinitely; since mobile phone service providers have a limited number of the “ports” that are necessary to execute eavesdropping warrants, it can sometimes be weeks, or even months, before a wiretap is finally installed. If, by that time the target has “switched” phones, the execution of the eavesdropping warrant will more often than not, amount to a complete waste of scarce law enforcement resources2. Far better spent, of course, would be the time and money necessary to learn the number of the target’s newest telephone. A recent phenomenon, however, demonstrates that this may be easier said than done. Several high-level narcotics traffickers targeted by the Organized Crime Narcotics Unit (OCNU) of the New York County District Attorney’s Office have begun to rely on the use of rented mobile phones and, in several instances, on the use of phones borrowed, purchased or leased from suspected members of cocaine supply networks. Under these circumstances, it is difficult, if not impossible, to learn the target’s “new” phone number without interceptions over the “old” phone relating to the plan to “switch” numbers. That, obviously, is the kingpin’s intent – to eliminate any trail connecting a particular phone number to the target’s narcotics distribution and money laundering activities.
Although the fraud-related crimes in this area are routinely lower-level felonies than the narcotics and money laundering felonies, they are inextricably interwoven in the criminal scheme and deserve to be addressed. Apart from the fundamental impetus to investigate the fraud…they are together even more compelling reasons to integrate the fraud investigation into a narcotics and money laundering investigation.
And, even if the kingpin cannot cover that trail entirely, he or she can at least delay its discovery for a sufficient period of time to minimize, if not eliminate, the risk that wiretap will be installed on the “new” phone before the target “switches” phones again. Many of the narcotics and money laundering networks that have been investigated by the OCNU have employed just such an electronic “shell game.” In those instances where we have been able to follow the “trail” leading from one mobile phone to another, we have frequently been led to storefront businesses3 in New York City. We have reason to believe, through investigation and telephone toll analyses, that, in several instances, the operators of these business are far from innocent store owners who just happen to provide a service that high-level Manhattan drug traffickers find useful. Quite the contrary, some of these businesses have come to the attention of the OCNU in the past under circumstances indicating that they may be willing accomplices of sophisticated drug organizations. To date, those investigations have revealed that there is a demonstrable nexus between well-established narcotics distribution organizations operating in Manhattan and these storefront businesses who are offering a variety of communications services to their drug-dealing clientele. Those storefronts, which are typically established as “travel agencies” and/or “realtors” render services that include: (1) rentals of mobile phones and beepers, (2) the issuance of money orders, (3) access to fax machines, and (4) the transmission of funds by wire. These businesses also provide other support to their narcotics-trafficking customers by renting post office boxes, supplying mail drops, leasing apartments and “stash houses,” and selling fictitious driver’s licenses, identification, vehicle registrations and other documents. By using these services in assorted combinations, drug kingpins are not only reducing the danger of wiretaps of their mobile phones, but also insulating themselves from the risks associated with the use of “cloned beepers,” the installation of “bugs,” the execution of wiretaps on land-line phones, the execution of search warrants, the use of mail covers, the filing (and subsequent analysis) of federal Currency Transaction Reports, the “running” of license plates, and the examination of financial and banking records, including wire transfer orders and records reflecting the purchase of money orders and bank checks. Indeed, these storefront businesses provide “one-stop shopping” for drug distribution networks that are intent on exploiting the “shell game” to its fullest by maintaining phones, “stash” locations, residences, credit cards, corporation, assets and driver’s licenses in a variety of names – all for the purpose of distributing narcotics and laundering drug money while shrouded in relative anonymity. The universal common denominator that continually reappears in OCNU investigations is cellular phone usage and the manipulation of the fraud employed in that usage. Although the fraud-related crimes in this area are routinely lower-level felonies than the narcotics and money laundering felonies, they are inextricably interwoven in the criminal scheme and deserve to be addressed. Apart from the fundamental impetus to investigate the fraud, namely because it is systematically reoccurring, they are together even more compelling reasons to integrate the fraud investigation into a narcotics and money laundering investigation. First, the fraud-crime evidence provides a trail to the target. This trail consists of the identifiers associated with the phone itself. The Electronic Serial Number (“ESN”) can be tracked through telephone number changes that will not obfuscate the target phone since the ESN betrays the phone’s true identity. The phone subscriber information can reappear in other contexts such as: credit reports, car registrations, etc. This information, despite its falsity, leads to a trail of data that contributes to the ultimate identification of the network. Although the target’s use of clone phone in electronic surveillance investigations is particularly frustrating for the investigator; it is worth pursuing. These phones are, by their nature, short duration electronic surveillance targets. Accordingly, they are “made to order” for the illicit network; and the targets feel less vulnerable on these phones. How to resolve this? First, the electronic surveillance objectives can be expanded to include the eradication of the “cloning” network. Hence, the relevant minimization procedures will broaden to include the fraud-related objectives. Secondly, the evidence gathered in the grand jury investigation can be used for a net worth assessment of the target for tax crimes or even larceny crimes. Third, from a trial perspective the fraud evidence is very helpful. The prosecution, at trial, invariably will demonstrate the quantity of money made in the course of the narcotics crimes. The jury will also be shown that despite these profits the targets had to steal the phones of unsuspecting individuals, like themselves, to ply their illicit trade. This is compelling evidence from a jury trial perspective. The fraud crime, although a lesser felony than the narcotics or money laundering felonies, serves a purpose in enterprise-driven cases. It is the means to the ultimate profiteering end and should be addressed as such. CONCLUSIONSince all the main ingredients of a sophisticated narcotics enterprise – importation, distribution, street-level sales and money laundering – are concentrated in the narcotics networks of the 1900’s, these narcotics distribution and money laundering networks can be attacked in a meaningful way only if law enforcement agencies acquire and develop expertise in destroying both sides of these sophisticated organizations: the “powder” side and the “money” side. Since those organizations tend to be stratified, inveterate, insulated networks whose upper echelons often lie beyond traditional law enforcement methods of infiltration, an aggressive, comprehensive and integrated approach is essential if these entrenched enterprises are ever to be effectively eradicated. This assault must include and attack on the fraud-related crimes.By removing or modifying just one key part, virtually any machine can be incapacitated. Many cogs in the narcotics organization of the 1990’s play a part in keeping that machinery operable. Yet, the one component that has done more than any other to insulate the kingpin from law enforcement intervention is the telephone; it is the means through which the kingpin speaks to subordinates, the device through which all “beepers” work, the medium through which “faxes” travel, and the way in which money is transmitted through the wires. Cellular phones are rapidly becoming the lifeblood of the contemporary narcotics enterprise. They are vital tools to the networks they service and they can be significant tools in our criminal investigation. The investigation of the fraud crimes that are inherent in the usage of these phones can only enhance law enforcement’s likelihood of success in eradicating the larger criminal enterprise. ENDNOTES1. Of course, the “lag time” associated with implementing electronic surveillance varies in each case. The Organized Crime Narcotics Unit of the New York County District Attorney’s Office has, in many cases, been able to obtain wiretap orders within twenty-four hours after learning of a target’s telephone number and the facts supporting the issuance of the order. In several cases, the Unit has been able to prepare and submit wiretap applications within only an hour or two after obtaining the necessary facts. The ability to initiate electronic surveillance that quickly is a direct result of an enforcement team comprised of officers with an expertise in telephone analysis and a “tech” team with a good working relationship with the applicable phone company.2. Of course, cellular phone wiretaps may be executed without the use of a “port.” However, that variety of wiretap (which essentially forwards all calls to the law enforcement agency’s “port,” “pen register” or “DNR” cannot be used in conjunction with that kind of wiretap; this being the case, there is a delay in obtaining information concerning the nature of the call and, as to “outgoing” calls, the numbers dialed from the target phone. The SMART system is helpful in the use of this type of wiretap since it is essentially “real time”: billing information that can be used in conjunction with the wiretap. Additionally, according to representatives of several mobile phone companies licensed to operate in the New York metropolitan area, a recent advance in mobile communications technology may obviate that problem and eventually eliminate the need to use “ports” in conjunction with wiretaps on cellular phones. 3. Needless to say not every storefront business in New York City providing the described services is criminally involved. This discussion is limited only to those which our investigations have demonstrated to be criminally involved. 4. The anonymity provided through these tactics also permits members of drug networks to commit fraud. For instance, the use of a fictitious name to subscribe to a mobile phone allows the trafficker to enjoy “free” cellular service – at the expense of the phone company. True, the failure to pay the phone bill will, eventually, prompt the company to terminate service. However, since the trafficker plans to use the phone for a only a few weeks anyway, the fact that service may someday be terminated is not a concern to the trafficker. By the time the phone is disconnected, the shrewd trafficker will have long discarded it.
Ms DeMaria is a former Assistant District Attorney for New York County
|
|||||||